The Decline of Progressive Policy and the New Philanthropy

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What Has Philanthropy Done To Counter The Decline Of Progressive Policy?

1. Introduction

Momentous events took place in the United States during the 1960s. President John F. Kennedy challenged the nation, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country," stimulating a love-in for government and public policy.[(68)] Michael Harrington's *Other America* opened a huge window on poverty in America. Rachael Carson's *Silent Spring* became the clarion call for the new environmental movement. Betty Friedan articulated women's quest for equality, kindling the modern women's movement. The defeat of Barry Goldwater in his run for the Presidency in 1964 galvanized formation of today's conservative political movement. The civil rights movement of/for African Americans grew substantially and matured politically; significant legislation was enacted affecting voting rights, public accommodations and affirmative action. President Lyndon Baines Johnson proclaimed and funded a massive federal War on Poverty. Martin Luther King, Jr., civil rights leader extraordinaire, was assassinated. Urban race riots flashed in Watts (Los Angeles), Detroit, Washington, DC and other cities. Ralph Nader published *Unsafe at Any Speed*, jump starting the modern consumer movement. The Vietnam War grew into a monster and stateside protests became everyday occurrences. Working class white males began complaining about the new preferences in education and employment being given to Blacks and women.

During this decade of profound social change, the Ford Foundation and a few other foundations supported highly controversial activities, incurring the wrath of key congressional leaders. These controversies, along with other foundations' financial abuses of their tax-exempt positions, led to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which initiated substantial new regulation and taxing of private foundations.

To counter this destabilizing situation, John D. Rockefeller III organized the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (the Filer Commission).[(69)] The Donee Group subsequently organized to offer non-establishment perspectives on the Filer Commission's deliberations in1973-75. The Donee Group produced several papers decrying the very limited philanthropic funding of social activism and nonprofit advocacy.[(70)] The Filer Commission and Donee Group issued their final reports in 1975, creating national controversy around issues of philanthropic equity for all peoples.[(71)] And in a keynote address at the Council on Foundations annual conference, noted foundation leader David Hunter castigated foundations for their failure to support the civil rights movement.[(72)]

Emerging from the momentous 1960s, the national deliberations of the Filer Commission and the Donee Group and Hunter's challenge set a new direction for philanthropy for funding of progressive social action. What is its significance today within philanthropy? What have changes wrought by this new philanthropy meant for democratic policy making in America? As the conservative political movement continues to gain headway, and as progressive influence declines, why have progressives been so slow to respond to their political decline? Why has foundation funding of progressive social movements and social action failed to reverse this decline?

2. Foundation Funding of Progressive Causes

Politically conservative scholars contend that mainstream foundations provide substantial money to progressive causes. In 1994, Althea Nagai, Robert Lerner and Stanley Rothman wrote,

...given the well-documented liberalism of the academy and U.S. intellectuals, and the close relationship of both to foundations, one would predict a continued *preponderance* of funding oriented toward [the proposing of] liberal policy...Independent foundations give to activist groups seeking to alter government policy....*Most* recipients of such funds are either liberal or radical leftist groups (emphasis added).[73]

The Manhattan Institute's Heather MacDonald writes, "Once an agent for social good, the biggest U. S. foundations have become a political battering ram targeted at American society." [74]

However, coming from a different political perspective, scholar and community foundation director Emmett Carson asks, "...why has institutional philanthropy, widely believed to be the primary source of venture capital for new and controversial ideals, apparently not fulfilled this role in the area of social justice advocacy?" [75] Even more pointedly, historians Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz indicate that the philanthropic horizon holds no threat to the ruling classes, and believe that much of organized philanthropy is the means to maintain such classes and keep democracy within bounds.[76]

Considering these contradictory assessments of foundation support for progressive causes, what can the data and case studies about trends in foundation funding tell us?

J. Craig Jenkins first looked at foundation funding of progressive social movements using 1953 data, identifying only three foundations making $85,700 in grants, which was 0.00001% of all foundation grants. By "social movement" he meant "a collective attempt to organize or represent the interests of a previously unorganized or politically excluded group." The 1960s had an important influence on this situation, as by 1970 the number of foundations making social movement grants had grown to 65 and the amount given to $11 million, or 0.6% of all foundation grants.[77]

As one of several assessments of local philanthropy in the late 1970s-early 1980s, the Bay Area Committee for Responsive Philanthropy conducted a survey of 45 local foundations. The Committee's conclusion was that "The foundation community as a whole is either hostile or indifferent to the need for social change funding...Bay Area foundations have failed to actively support organizations working for social change." [78]

During the 1980s, "Advocacy groups scrambled to find new sources of income when the federal government curtailed its support," records Imig in *Poverty and Power: The Political Representation of Poor Americans*. "The capacities of private foundations, however, were overwhelmed by the magnitude of lost income from federal grants....Much private giving went to direct-service providers, who reported 'dramatic and sometimes even stunning' increases of 50 to 500 percent in demand for their services." [79]

By 1990, Jenkins and Abigail Halcli could document only a modest proportionate increase in social movement funding nationally over the 20 years since 1970. The number of foundations giving to progressive social movements had increased to 146 and their movement grants had grown to $88 million, but this amounted to only 1.1% of all foundation grant monies.[80] Thus, 99% of foundation money did *not* fund progressive social movements in 1990.

Writing about *Social Change Philanthropy in America* in 1990, Alan Rabinowitz observes that "Many of [the large foundations] made significant contributions to the social movements of the post-World War II epoch." [81] He adds,

The large foundations have realized since their origins in the nineteenth century that their grants were meant to induce some form of social change, for example, higher educational standards, new forms of social legislation, or the wider use of scientific methods. For most philanthropists, however, social change is problematic, and they prefer that their dollars go to noncontroversial objects of charity. They shy away from what they call 'social change advocacy'...funding of progressive social change activities is a relatively minor item on most philanthropic agendas.[82]

In the early 1990s, the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP), successor to the Donee Group, conducted in-depth studies of 10 of the 50 largest community foundations that, in part, supported the findings of Jenkins and Halcli and Rabinowitz. The NCRP studies were based on 582 mostly on-site interviews concerning these foundations which tout themselves as being the foundations closest to the people. Covington's summary of these 10 studies concluded:

A majority of the community foundations studied have been generally unresponsive to the least advantaged members of their home communities...Six of the ten community foundations distributed less than 50% of their total allocations primarily to benefit disenfranchised people, with five distributing less than 30%...Of the grants awarded primarily to benefit the disenfranchised,...most of the community foundations preferred to support the more established nonprofit organizations engaged in social service provision. The low level of support awarded to community organizing, public policy initiatives, issue advocacy or institutional reform activities suggests that community foundations do not consider social action to be a social good...In sum, neither equity nor empowerment are the primary values in the community work of most community foundations...[83]

When focusing on the community foundations' efforts in support of citizen empowerment, Covington added that "the level of community foundation support for citizen empowerment projects and social action organizations in low income and other disenfranchised communities was exceedingly low." [84]

Reviewing the history of philanthropy of and for Native Americans, African Americans, Latino Americans and Asian Americans, Carson observes, "Some culture-specific groups, despite having a substantial history in the United States, have yet to see elements of their social justice agenda accepted by the broader society or foundations." [85]

The National Network of Grantmakers (NNG) recently concluded that foundations give more for social change than what Jenkins and Halcli (1999) document of foundations' giving for social movements. In 1998, the NNG released a research report based on a survey of its 160 members and on data from the Women's Funding Network.. NNG found that foundations and religious funders made grants of $336 million for progressive social change in 1997, accounting for 2.4% of all foundation funding.[86] This figure is double the percentage Jenkins and Halcli documented for foundation giving to progressive social movements in 1990. Does this mean that foundations are continuing to increase their funding of progressive social movements. Not necessarily; the Jenkins and Halcli and NNG studies are not exactly comparable.[87]

Extrapolating NNG's findings to 2001, 2.4% of all foundation grants ($25.9 billion) would equal $622 million. This would be the total amount available in the U.S. for economic justice organizations designed to improve the status and opportunities for poor people, for racial/ethnic minority organizations, women's rights, disabled rights, advocacy for the aged, environmental protection, consumer rights, children's advocacy, prisoners' rights, gay/lesbian rights, the peace movement, third world advocacy and all other social action. To put the $622 million in perspective, a $1 million nonprofit organization today -- paying modest, but much less than private business, salaries -- can expect to field a staff of 10 with some help from a few interns and part-time consultants. Grassroots organizations usually run on less than $250,000 per year. Considering a normal student's pocket money, these may seem like very well funded organizations. But they are not - they are absolutely *not* big-time organizations. The American Cancer Society, for instance, spent $712 million in 2001.[88]

The studies of Jenkins and Halcli, Covington and NNG do *not* support the politically conservative projection of Nagai, Lerner and Rothman that a "preponderance of [foundation] funding [is] oriented toward [proposing of] liberal policy." [89] The empirical study by Nagai, Lerner and Rothman of all large foundations' public policy grants does not itself support their projection. They tallied $170 million in grants in 1986 and early 1987 to "liberal groups...for public policy," [90] an amount equal to only 2.7% of all foundation grants in 1986.[91]

Nevertheless, to Jenkins and Halcli:

Social movement philanthropy....constitutes a highly leveraged form of 'risk capital' philanthropy, having major impact on most of the social movements that have developed in the past four decades. It has fueled these movements in that it has provided needed technical resources and created new organizations that have been vital to securing and implementing movement gains. However, at the same time, it has also reduced the pressure on movement leaders to engage in costly and time-consuming grassroots organizing, thus potentially blunting the impact of these movements.[92]

Dowie in *American Foundations: An Investigative History* sees the glass to be emptier than Jenkins and Halcli:

...With the single exception of civil rights, foundation interests in America's signature social movements - for women's rights, peace, environment, environmental justice, students, gay liberation, and particularly labor - has been parsimonious, hesitant, late, and at times counterproductive.[93] ...Funds to organizations representing the poor and disadvantaged have always been dwarfed by more and larger grants to public interest research groups and highly professionalized middle-class reform organizations... [94] Moreover, large

foundations, no matter how liberal they may be perceived to be by conservative [commentators],...do not harbor ambitious political strategies; nor do they seek to fundamentally restructure society...most American foundations are centrist, and their philanthropy is cautious and apolitical.[95]

"Mainline foundations tend to take a bland, neutral stance on most of these issues," comments Waldemar Nielsen. "It represents a lack of courage, an unwillingness to get into controversy. It's a kind of hiding out from reality." [96]

3. Corporate Funding of Racial/ethnic Populations, Civil Rights, Race Relations & Advocacy

Because the civil rights movement gave racial/ethnic minorities unparalleled leverage over corporations during the past quarter century, as the corporations implemented (or delayed) legally required affirmative action regarding employment and government contracting, NCRP sought to ascertain the state of corporate funding targeted for racial/ethnic populations. Three reports were issued between1993 and 2000.[97]

In the latest NCRP corporate study, a review of 124 top companies in 15 major industries, the companies gave $180 million for racial/ethnic populations in 1995. Against profits of $109 billion (99 companies reporting), this amounts to only 1/6 of 1% of pretax profits. Moreover, only 40% of these grant dollars went to organizations controlled by racial/ethnic populations. Why is constituency control important for democratic governance? Since its inception in 1969 the Catholic Campaign for Human Development has required its grantees to be constituency controlled based on the firm belief that such organizations offer the best opportunity for resolving social ills and raising up leaders to represent the disadvantaged.

In the three NCRP corporate studies, the category of funding that is closest to being pure social change is the category of "civil rights, race relations and advocacy." These numbers may be the most telling regarding what is happening to corporate funding of social change. In 1988, the top profit-making companies gave 2.0% of their total grants to this category. In 1993, the top telecommunications companies gave 1.6%. In 1995, the top companies in 15 other major industries gave only 0.5%.[98]

The Foundation Center data are similar to the NCRP data. The Center reports that corporate foundations gave 1.0% for "civil rights and social action" in 1989 (1988 data were not available), dropping to 0.7% in 1993 and 1995.[99] Corporate support for advocacy by and for racial/ethnic minorities at this level is proportionately comparable to foundations' support for progressive social movements and social change, according to Jenkins and Halcli and NNG. These findings challenge Lester Salamon's exploratory assessment that there is *no* correlation between corporate support and nonprofit advocacy.[100]

The conservatives, on the other hand, had no doubt about this linkage. In 1987 the Capital Research Center initiated a series of reports that rated corporate funding of progressive nonprofits. These were disseminated to directors of major corporations nationwide with the intent of reducing this funding.[101] A few years later, Dave Ransom documented anti-abortion activists' attacks on corporations for their grants to women's organizations advocating pro-choice policies.[102]

4. United Ways Do Not Fund Social Change

United Ways, which used to be, maybe even today are, the most well known of all charities. These are federated fund raising drives - one in every city in the U.S. - 1400 nationwide. They principally raise money from employee payroll deductions at the workplace and from corporate donations, but increasingly they raise large contributions from wealthy individuals. They raised $3.5 billion in 1998. As with foundations, United Ways give little to social movements such as women's rights, minority civil rights and disability rights. They give virtually nothing to environmental organizations or consumer protection.

Because United Ways give so little to groups seeking to expand the promises of democratic governance, thousands of smaller and otherwise excluded charities started their own federated fund raising organizations which actively compete with United Ways for workplace donations. There are over 200 across the country, and they raised $310 million in 1997.[103] Many of these alternatives are discussed in the last section of this chapter.

5. Project Support instead of Core Support

It is instructive to contrast the path taken by conservative foundations -- in funding a public policy infrastructure for the conservative political movement -- to the path taken by mainstream foundations. *Moving a Public Policy Agenda: The Strategic Philanthropy of Conservative Foundations*, NCRP's 1997 study, concludes that, in "funding a policy movement, rather than specific program areas,

[the 12 conservative foundations studied] distinguish themselves from the philanthropic mainstream, which has long maintained a pragmatic, non-ideological and field-specific approach to the grant making enterprise." [(104)]

The conservative foundations' general support for a movement contrasts sharply with the project funding of most other foundations. According to a recent NCRP study of foundation funding of grassroots organizations, involving 26 grassroots organizations, two-thirds of the grassroots organizations believe they do not receive an adequate level of core or general operating support from foundations. [(105)]

The leaders of these nonprofits offer the following rationales for more core support:

We could be more flexible; it would be easier to build long term capacity.

We wouldn't have to do so many little specific projects.

We could do what we wanted!

You can't do a project if you can't do your core work; you have to take care of basic needs, just like in a family.

Project dollars don't pay for essential overhead costs.

Core support is essential to do actual programs, to maintain the organization, to continue the organization.

You need core support for necessary shifts in your program; you can't shift so easily if you are locked into funded projects.

We need core support to make us a stronger group.[(106)]

A recent study of 73 charities actively engaged in state public policy change on behalf of poor people and other "under-represented communities" reveals that the "the number one gap in the [California] public policy nonprofit landscape is the scarcity of foundation funds...[Moreover], over half of the total foundation dollars in this sample were distributed among [only] ten of the nonprofit organizations, while many of the remaining 63 [organizations] ...received little or no funding for their policy work." [(107)]

"Overall, foundation funding for nonprofit organizations was uneven, transitory...Many respondents noted the instability of the foundation funding they did receive. A majority of grantees were funded year by year or, if fortunate, for two years" [(108)]...This "prevalent short term grant making is ineffective in creating policy change," Drabble and Abrenilla conclude.[(109)] "The few organizations that did receive large, long-term grants reported that they were able to be more strategic about their overall activities and policy plans as a direct result of this support." [(110)]

Foundation funding is "almost always project driven," report Drabble and Abrenilla.[(111)] "General operating support is rare, but has tremendous potential for advancing policy efforts. [Only 16% of the total funding from foundations was general operating support. The] "study results suggest that increased funding of general operating support would allow public policy nonprofits to respond readily and creatively to emerging policy issues, to increase involvement in policy-related activities, to improve communications, and to provide better education and leadership development in communities." [(112)]

Looking at national data from The Foundation Center, general support constituted only 14% of all foundation grant dollars in 1999, about the same as reported above, whereas program or project support was at 43%. (Capital support, unspecified, research, student aid and other make up the other 43%.) "Large, staffed foundations tend to award [an even] greater share of program grants and a lesser share of general support grants..." [(113)]

Grant seekers can't change the power imbalance between donors and themselves -- donors have money, thus power, and grant seekers want some of this money and power in order to make the world better. But donors can choose to give money for core organizational funding, rather than for specific projects or programs. Steve Burkeman, secretary of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust in the United Kingdom and author of the annual Allen Lane Lecture in 1999, correctly points out that, by following the project/program

course, donors retain maximum control. However, by granting core funding, donors, in effect, transfer "more of the power of choice" to the grantee -- "the transfer of money is also the transfer of power." [(114)]

Core support can be revolutionary. Perhaps that is why core funding is much more often granted to institutions of higher education or arts and culture -- which are not likely to do anything revolutionary -- than to grassroots organizations in low-income neighborhoods, activist immigrant groups, or organizations of the disabled and marginalized racial/ethnic groups -- which might. One explanation for the correlation between core funding and certain institutions is based on "class affinity." Staff and board leaders of arts or higher education organizations are fundamentally of the same class as the donors, whereas leaders of many grassroots groups are distinctly not. The donor brain thinks, "We can trust Yale University and the Metropolitan Opera to do the 'right thing.'"

With foundation and other philanthropic grant money for progressive social movements and social change quite limited, foundations focused on policy targets of opportunity, in an attempt to use this small amount of money efficiently and to increase accountability for its use. This led to an increase in the proportion of funding for project grants over institution-building, general operating support grants. This project funding aided and abetted development of policy silos and policy incrementalism, as discussed above.

6. Summary - The *Insufficiency* of Philanthropic Funding for Progressive Causes

During the first six months after conservatives took control of Congress in 1995, mainstream foundations took no action, preferring instead to think about what was happening, and in some cases, to study the new situation.[(115)] Slowly foundations have emerged from their backrooms, but their thinking still remains where it had been before the conservative takeover of Congress and the presidency. They still believe they have leverage over public policy and that they are smarter than any organizations in the field.

Meanwhile, progressive advocacy organizations continue to work within their policy silos, often hampered as much by their foundation funding as helped. Drabble and Abrenilla found that foundation funding of nonprofit advocacy at the state level (California) was so categorical that the boundaries defining nonprofit missions became "barriers to permeation and cross-issue connections." Organizations operating in isolation failed to work with stakeholders outside their traditional networks, thereby failing to "advance broader changes." [(116)]

Therefore, with so little philanthropic funding from foundations and corporations, and so much of it trapped in project funding and policy silos, progressives have had difficulty advancing their agendas of equity and justice for all. In contrast, conservative foundations' *strategic* philanthropy -- not just grant dollars -- underwrote a public policy infrastructure of think tanks, lobbying networks, academic programs and new media for the increasingly powerful conservative movement.

Why has a countervailing philanthropy not emerged to foster creation of a broad progressive movement capable of exerting national power? The answer is three-fold. First, government and foundation grants for narrow projects ghettoized progressive nonprofits into "policy silos" -- narrow issue areas, such as low-income housing, inimical to broad-based coalition building. Second, liberal control of Congress through 1994 enabled the policy silos to enact incremental progressive gains. Third, after conservatives took control of Congress in 1995, neither foundations nor nonprofits have been able to climb out of their policy silos to construct broad-based coalitions that develop a progressive policy agenda including attention to middle-class voters' interests.

A new, holistic progressive vision, which includes the middle class, will not be forged unless existing nonprofit organizations get together to talk, think, coalesce and conceptualize this new vision (or several). Unfortunately, stimulating this kind of dialogue is not an item on the agendas of most of the leading mainstream foundations, whose egocentric agendas remain encased in the old policy silos.

Notes

68. John F. Kennedy, *Inaugural Address,* Jan. 20, 1961.

69. Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (Filer Commission), *Giving in America: Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector. Report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,* Washington, DC: Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1975.

70. Thomas R. Asher, "Public Needs, Public Policy, and Philanthropy: An Analysis of the Basic Issues and Their Treatment by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs;" Carey, Sarah C. "Philanthropy and the Powerless." Carey, Sarah C.

"Philanthropy and the Powerless;" David Horton Smith, "The Role of the United Way in Philanthropy;" Mary J. Tully, "Who's Funding the Women's Movement?" In *Research Papers sponsored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,*Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Treasury,1977.

71. Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, *op. cit.;* Donee Group, *Private Philanthropy: Vital & Innovative? or Passive & Irrelevant?* Washington, DC: Donee Group, 1975.

72. David Hunter, Keynote speech at the Council on Foundations annual conference, Chicago, 1975.

73. Althea K. Nagai, Robert Lerner & Stanley Rothman, *Giving for Social Change: Foundations, Public Policy, and the American Political Agenda,*Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,1994, pp. 36-7.

74. Heather MacDonald, "Destructive Philanthropy," *The Wall Street Journal* (quoted in Dowie, *op. cit.,* p. 213).

75. Emmett D. Carson, "The Roles of Indigenous and Institutional Philanthropy in Advancing Social Justice." In Clotfelter, C. & Ehrlich, T. (ed.) *Philanthropy and the nonprofit sector in a changing America,* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 269.

76. Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "Foundations and Ruling Class Elites," *Daedalus* 116, no. 1, 1987, pp. 1-40.

77. Jenkins and Halcli, *op. cit.*

78. Bay Area Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, *Small Change from Big Bucks: A Report and Recommendations on Bay Area Foundations and Social Change*, San Francisco: Bay Area Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 1979, p. 6.

79. Imig, *op. cit.,* p. 38.

80. Jenkins and Halcli, *op. cit.* Of this $88 million, $68 million was granted by private and community foundations and $20 million by new alternative funding institutions and religious funders. See later discussion of these alternative and religious funders.

81. Alan Rabinowitz, *Social Change Philanthropy in America,* Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1990, p. 41.

82. *Ibid.,* pp.4-5.

83. Sally Covington, *Community Foundations and the Disenfranchised: A Summary Report on Ten Top Community Foundations' Responsiveness to Low Income and Other Historically Disenfranchised Groups in American Society,* Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, November, 1994, pp. 48 and 50.

84. Sally Covington, *Community Foundations and Citizen Empowerment: Limited Support for Democratic Renewal,* Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, December, 1994, p. 6.

85. Carson, *op. cit.,* p. 250.

86. National Network of Grantmakers, *Social Change Grantmaking in the U.S.: The Mid-1990s,* San Diego: National Network of Grantmakers, 1998.

87. Jenkins and Halcli and NNG utilized very similar samples of funders in their research. The former identified funders starting with those in *The Grant-Seekers Guide(s)*, published initially by NNG, and expanding through "snowball" nominations to include ultimately a total of 146 foundations and religious funders. NNG surveyed its 160 foundation and religious funder members and reviewed data about women's funds from the Women's Funding Network. However, Jenkins and Halcli used a strict definition of *social movement* funding in coding foundation grants (see above), while NNG collected data through its members, who were allowed to designate "their own *'social change'* grants according to each organization's grant making philosophy" which meant that "definitions... [varied] widely from one institution to another." (Aileen Shaw, E-mail to the author, July 25, 2000.)

88. American Cancer Society, IRS Form 990, Year 2001, p. 1.

89. Nagai, Lerner and Rothman, *op. cit.,* p. 36.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

91. Although this 2.7% proportion for liberal groups' public policy grants exceeds that documented by Jenkins and Halcli (1.1% for "social movements" in 1990) and NNG (2.4% for "social change" in 1997), it has to be recognized that "public policy" grants cover a much broader spectrum than the categories defined by Jenkins and Halcli or NNG.

92. Jenkins and Halcli, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

93. Dowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

95. *Ibid*., p. 218.

96. As quoted in *Ibid.*, p.218.

97. Steven L. Paprocki and Robert O. Bothwell, *Corporate Grantmaking: Racial/Ethnic Populations, Phase One,*Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy,1993; Steven L. Paprocki and Robert O. Bothwell, *Answering the Call? The Telecommunications Industry's Grantmaking for Racial/Ethnic Communities,*Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 1995; Steven L. Paprocki, *Grants: Corporate Grantmaking for Racial and Ethnic Communities,* Wakefield, RI: Moyer Bell, 2000.

98. Steven Paprocki, Telephone conversation with author, Nov. 28, 2000.

99. Loren Renz, *Foundation Giving,* New York: Foundation Center, 1991; Loren Renz, Steven Lawrence & Richard R. Treiber, *Foundation Giving,* New York: Foundation Center, 1995; Loren Renz, Crystal Mandler & Trink C. Tran, *Foundation Giving,* New York: Foundation Center, 1997. It is interesting that the Foundation Center only studies corporate foundations, while NCRP reviewed grants by both corporate foundations and some other corporate giving programs. Also, the Foundation Center classifies only grants of $10,000 and up, while the NCRP studies classified all grants of $1,000 and up.

100. Lester M. Salamon, "Explaining Nonprofit Advocacy: An Exploratory Analysis," Presented at Independent Sector Spring Research Forum, Alexandria, VA, March 24, 1995.

101. Marvin N. Olasky, *Patterns of Corporate Philanthropy: Public Affairs Giving and the Forbes One Hundred,* Washington, DC: Capital Research Center, 1987; Roger E. Meiners and David N. Laband, *Patterns of Corporate Philanthropy,* Washington, DC: Capital Research Center, 1988; James T. Bennett, *Patterns of Corporate Philanthropy: Ideas, Advocacy, and the Corporation,* Washington, DC: Capital Research Center, 1989; Thomas J. DiLorenzo, *Patterns of Corporate Philanthropy,* Washington, DC: Capital Research Center, 1990.

102. Dave Ransom, *Rightwing Attacks on Corporate Giving,*Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 1990.

103. Robert O. Bothwell & Dan Delany, *Charity at the Workplace 1997,* Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 1998.

104. Covington, 1997, *op. cit.*, p.48.

105. Robert O. Bothwell, "Foundation Funding of Grassroots Organizations," *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing,* Vol. 7, No. 4, Nov. 2002, p. 387.

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 387-8.

107. Laurie Drabble & Michelle Abrenilla, *A Democratic Landscape: Funding Social Change in California,* Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 2000, p. 3.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

113. Steven Lawrence, Robin Gluck & Dia Ganguly, *Foundation Giving Trends*, New York, NY: The Foundation Center, 2001, p. 39.

114. Steven Burkeman, "Allen Lane Lecture," *Trust Monitor*, Autumn, 1999.

115. Covington and Parachini, *op. cit.*

116. Drabble and Abenilla, *op. cit.*, p. 3.